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Judicial Misconduct During Jury 
Deliberations 
By Bennett L. Gershman * 
The author considers the two principal types of improper judicial 
behavior that may occur during the jury deliberation process. 
Judicial conduct that attempts to place undue pressure on a jury to 
reach a verdict may include verdict-urging instructions, threats and 
intimidation, and inquiry into the numerical division of the jury on 
the merits of the verdict. Judicial participation in private, ex parte 
communications with jurors may also subvert orderly trial procedure 
and undermine the impartiality of the jury. Neither kind of judicial 
conduct may be allowed to compel a verdict from a jury. 
The relationship between judge and jury is never more intense 
than during the jury deliberation process. During this period, the 
judge exerts considerable influence over the jury, and he must 
use that influence prudently and sensitively. The judge ministers 
to the jury's personal needs, controls the deliberation schedule, 
facilitates review of evidence, answers jury questions about 
legal and factual issues , reiterates legal instructions, investigates 
allegations of irregularities, and determines the overall pace and 
extent of deliberations. In exercising these functions, the judge 
must strive to maintain a delicate balance between affording the 
jury sufficient autonomy to reach conscientiously no decision 
and at the same time urge the jury without improper pressure to 
reach a fair and an impartial verdict. This tension between the 
interest in conscientious disagreement and the interest in a verdict 
makes the jury deliberation process a fertile setting for judicial 
misconduct. 
Two principal kinds of improper judicial behavior can occur 
during this process: first, judicial conduct that attempts to place 
undue pressure on a jury to reach a verdict, and second, judicial 
particip'ltion in private, ex parte communications with jurors. 
Each of these topics is discussed below. 
Coercing a Verdict 
Verdict-Urging Instructions 
"The very object of the jury system," the United States 
Supreme Court wrote in Allen v. United States, "is to secure 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
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unanimity by a comparison of views , and by argument among 
the jurors themselves. "I There is no requirement, however, that 
a jury agree. A hung jury is a legitimate end of atrial. 2 This 
inherent tension between encouraging legitimate agreement while 
not discouraging principled dissent has been at the ro t f the 
controversy over the degree of pressure that a judge may employ 
in urging a deadlocked jury to reach an agreement. 3 The so-
called Allen charge, from the decision bearing that name, has 
been the subject of considerable debate since the case was decided 
nearly 100 years ago. 4 Known variously as the "dynamite" 
1 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492. 501 ( 189 ). There is n bligation on the 
parl of a judge to give any special instru 'lion when a jury reports disagreement. 
The judge may simply elect to declare a mistrial. Uniled States v. S e, 505 P.2d 
845 (9th Cir. 1974 eert. denied , 420 U.S. 992 (1975). There may be double-
jeopardy oneems, however iJl discharging premallHely a deliberatingjury. United 
State, v. Lansdown, 460 F .2d 164 (4lh Cir. 1972) (discharge of jury after it had 
deliberated for eleven hours without attempting I determine whether it could rea h 
a verdict prevented retrial on double-jeopardy grounds) . 
. The hung jury has been cJull'<:lcterized as "the jury system's most interesting 
ph nom non . 1.n one sense it marks a rHilure of the system, since it n cessari ly 
bring a de laration of a mistrial in its wake. In another sense, it is a valued a' ' IUaJlce 
of integrity, since it Clin serve to protect th diss nl f a minority . " H. Kalven & H. 
Zeisel, the Americ(lIIJury 453 ( 1966). See Arizona v. Washingt n 434 U.S. 497 , 
509 (1978 (defendant's ri ·ht to have trial completed by particular jury must be 
weighed against defendant ', right to c nsidered judgment 01' all jurors, rather than a 
judgment resulting from pressures of 'protracted and exhau ling" d liberati n ')' 
Huffman v. Uilited States, 297 F.2d 754 759 (5111. Cil'.) (Brown, J. . dissenting 
C"lthink a misu'ial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liherty . In Illany area' it is the 
ole means by which one or a few may tand out against an verwhelming 
contemp rary public sentiment. Nothing should interfere with it exercise' '), eerr. 
denied , 370 U.S. 955 ( 1962 ; State V. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 761 P.2 1 1158 , 11 64 
( L988 ("the hungjllry is n t ajurisprudemial failure, but ral11er is a commendation 
n 111e fail' and evenhanded administration of justice' . In tileir classic studY, The 
American Jury, Professors Kalven and Zeisel found l1,at more thaJl 5 percent of all 
juries end in a mistrial. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel , supra. 
It should be noted thai many jurisdicUons do not require unanimity in civil cases, 
and five tates permit a convic tion on Jess than a unanimous verdict. H. Kalven & 
H. Zeisel, supra, at 461 n.6. Moreover, ajury may be authorized to return a partial 
verdict on one or more defendants or one or more offenses. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 
§ 310.70 (McKinney 1988). A judge may ask Ihe jury to render such a partial 
verdict and then resume deliberations on the remaining defendants and charges. See 
United States V. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (l l th Cir. 1984) ; Morgan V. Uniled States, 
380 F.2d 686 (9th Cil'. 1967), cert. denied, 390 V.S. 962 ( L968). A judge 'hould 
be careful, however, not to suggest that the jury compromi e its conscienliou, ly 
held beliefs for the sake of expediency. United States V. Smoot, 463 F. 2d 122 1 
(D.C. Cif. 1972). 
-' Every federal appellate court, and virtually every state jurisdiction, uses some 
form of a supplemental jury charge. See Lowenfield V. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 
n.l (1988). Note, "Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge," 37 Me. L. Rev. 167 
(1985). 





charge,5 the "nitroglycerin" charge,6 the" shotgun" instruction ,7 
and the' 'third-degree" instruction ,8 the Allen charge is a supple-
mental instruction that, in essence, admonishes a deadlocked 
jury to (1) decide the case if it can~ conscientiously do so; (2) 
give deference to the views of other jurors with the objective of 
being convinced, and (3) urge minority jurors to reconsider 
the reasonableness of their convictions. The Supreme Court 
described the instructions as follows: 
These instructions were quite lengthy, and were, in substance, that in a 
large proportion of cases, absolute certainty could not be expected; that, 
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and 
not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should 
examine the question submitted with candor, and with a proper regard 
and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to 
decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should 
listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; 
that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror 
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no 
impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally 
intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority were for 
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not 
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred 
in by the majority. 9 
U.S . 837 (Allen harge un unwarranted judi inl n r achmenL of xclusivc province 
oflhejury) ' United SUItes v. Thoma, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184n.45, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (en banc) (rejecLing Allen charge as unduly co rci ve); United StaLes v. Brown, 
41 I F.2d 930 (7th ir, 1969) , en. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970) ; Pields v. State, 
487 P.2d 831, 840 (Alaska 1971) (Allen charge' less an object ofcoffimcndation 
than toleration"); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960) (rejecting 
Allen charge); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959) same). See 
also Note, "On Instructing Deadlocked Juries," 78 Yale LJ. 100 (1968) ; Note. 
"Due Process, Judicial Economy, and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of lheAl/en 
Charge," 53 Va. L. Rev. (1967); Comment, "Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A 
Critical Look at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386 (1964). See also 
Annotation, "Instructions Urging Dissenting Jurors in State Criminal Cases to Give 
Due Consideration to Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge)-Modern Cases," 97 
A.L.R.3d 96 (1980); Annotation, "Verdict-Urging Instructions in Civil Case 
Stressing Desirability and Importance of Agreement," 38 A.L.R.3d 1281 (1971), 
5 Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852,853 (,5th Cir. 1962). 
6 Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754,759 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring 
and dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). 
7 State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 431,321 P.2d 202,204 (1958). 
8 Leechv. People 112 10. 120, 123. 146 P .2d 346 47(l944).Allenhasalso 
been described as "a sharp punch to the jury , reminding Lhem of the nature of their 
dUlY and the Lime and expen 'e or a trial , and urging lhem to try again to reach a 
verdict" United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982). 
9 Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. 
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Embellishments of the Allen charge have elicited tolerant as well 
as intolerant responses by the courts. These additions have 
included reminding jurors of the expense and inconvenience of a 
retrial lO or that the case would have to be retried by another jury, 
should the present jury fail to reach a verdict. II 
The principal concern over the Allen charge is that it pressures 
minority jurors to surrender their principles by giving them the 
impression that the judge agree with the maj rity viewpoint and 
by threatening continued c nfinement until a verdict is reached. 12 
Recognition that other jurors must remain confined because of a 
minority juror' individual beliefs necessarily produces strong 
pressmes to reach agreement that often have little to do with the 
merits of the case. Moreover, some critics ask whether the 
purported societal gains in fewer retrials as a result of the Allen 
charge are offset by the appellate complications in determining 
whether the trial judge gave a correct charge at the correct point 
in time during the deliberations. 13 
Although the Allen charge or some similar variation continues 
to be an accepted instruction in many jurisdictions,'4 several 
federal '5 and statel6 appellate courts, pursuant to their supervisory 
10 United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962); State v. Flint, 11 4 idaho 
806,761 P.2d 1158 (1988 ; Golden v. FirslCilY Nal ' l Bank, 75 1 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1988); Vanderbilt Univ . v. Steely 566 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1978). 
II United State v. Porrer 881 F .2d 878 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 110 S. t. 348 
( 1989) ' United States v. Smith , 857 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1988); Hodge' v. United 
States , 408 F .2d 543 (8th Cir. 1969). 
I? Such an instructi n can have an even more del terious e ffect wben tbe identity 
of tbe recalcitrant jurors is known and they are, in effect, singled out. See Indiana 
State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderbur, 432 N.E.2d 4L8 (lnd. Ct. App. 1982). 
1 Andrew ' v. United States, 309 F.2d L27 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 372 
U.S. 946 (1963 (Wisdom. J . dissenling) ("[ALlen s] time-saving merits io the 
district court are more than nullified by the complications it. caus S 0 appeal when 
the reviewing court must determine whether in the circumstances of a particular 
case the tr ial judge applied the charg properly- in substance and timing ' ). 
14 The Suprem Counrecently reaffirmed the principles underlyingAlIell. Lowen-
field v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 23 1 237 (1988) C"[tJhe continuing validity of this Court s 
ob ervati os in AI/en are beyond dispute " ). See Kawakita v. nited States, 343 
U.S. 7] 7 (1952) (Allen churge a sumed to be appropriate instruction to deadlocked 
juries). See also Note, note supra. 
I ~ Several circuit courts have indicated djsapproval r its u ·e. See United States 
v. Thomas 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971 ). United Slates v. Fi ravanti. 4~2 F.2d 
407 (3d Cir.) , cerl. denied 396 V .S. 837 1969); UnHed States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 
930 (7th Cir. 1969), cen. denied, 396 V.S. 10 17 (1970) . 
16 Several states have banned the Allert charge. See State v. Flinl, 11 4 Idaho 806, 
761 P.2d 115 (1988) People v. Gain .r, .19 Cal. d 835 , 566 P.2d 997 , 139 Ca1. 




powers, have either abandoned Allen entirely or severely limited 
its use. Many of these courts favor the standard proposed by the 
American Bar Association (ABA), which recommends a five-
part instruction upon which a deadlocked jury may properly 
be advised.17 Some courts, although allowing an Allen-type 
instruction, do not permit any extensions or alterations, indicating 
that the instruction is the farthest limit in verdict -urging language 
that they will tolerate. 18 
Reviewing courts examine the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the use of the charge and proceed on a case-by-case 
basis' 'to determine whether the taint of coercion was present. "19 
These courts analyze the content of the instruction for particularly 
coercive language,20 the failure to give an instruction balancing 
Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960); Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88,371 
A.2d 663 (1977). It is also improper to give an Allen charge during the penalty 
phase of a capital trial. See Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439 (Del. Super. 1985); Rose 
v. State, 425 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Super.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983). 
17 This portion of the ABA's recommended instruction reads as follows: 
(i) [T]hat in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; 
(ii) [T]hat jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual 
judgment; 
(iii) [T]hat each juror must decide the case for himself or herself but only after an 
impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors; 
(iv) [T]hat in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine 
his or her own views and change an opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous; 
and 
(v) [T]hat no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight 
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of the other jurors, or for 
the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
ABA, StandardsJor Criminal Justice § 15-4.4 (2d ed. 1986). 
Several federal and state courts have adopted this standard. See Note, note 3 
supra, at 167,171-172 n.35 (1985) (collecting cases). 
18 Potterv. United States, 691 F.2d 1275 (8thCir. 1982)(improper"departures" 
impose almost impossible task of weighing prejudicial impact of variations); United 
States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348,354 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968) 
(charge "approaches the limits beyond which a trial court should not venture in 
urging a jury to reach a verdict"); Vanderbilt Univ . v. Steely, 566 S.W.2d 853 
(Tenn. 1978) (court requires "strict adherence" to its previously mandated charge). 
19 Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1970). See United 
States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1152 (1990). 
2U Unitea States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878,888 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 348 (1989) (court must scrutinize language of instruction and its incorporation 
with other instructions); United States v. Young, 702 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1983) 
("Allen charges must be utilized with great care and scrutinized carefully"); United 
States v. Stewart, 513 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1975) (improper use of "cancer" analogy 
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the interest in agreement with the interest in conscientious deci-
sion making, 21 or the speed with which the jury returned its verdict 
after having been given the supplemental charge. 22 Remarks 
empha ' iz ing the expense and inconvenience of a retrial ,23 or 
. ugges ting that the case will have to be retried again24 have been 
criticized as il1je ting unfair pre sure on juries. 
Some courts recommend that a deadlock-type instruction be 
given during the main charge, before the jurors take positions, 
at a time when there is not yet a minority to feel pressured, in 
order to ameliorate such pressure on minority jurors if a deadlock 
should occur. 25 An Allen-type instruction should be given only 
when clearly warranted, 26 although there is no absolute right for 
counsel to be forewarned before the Allen charge is given. 27 
Giving such an instruction to a jury that has not indicated a 
deadlock may be reversible error. 28 The failure to object to a 
verdict-urging instruction, however, may constitute a waiver of 
the claim on appeaP9 or at least diminish the force of the claim 
21 United States v. Ronder, 639 F .2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981); People v. Ali, 65 
A.D .2d 513 , 514,409 N.Y.S .2d 12 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y .2d 920,393 N.E.2d 
481,419 N.Y.S .2d 487 (1979) . 
21 United Slates v. Webb. 8 16 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987) (verdict returned fifteen 
minutes arrcr receiving deadlock instru lion); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 
543, 554 (8th i r. 1969) U u ry c nti nued del iberating for another day before reaching 
verdict) ; Will iams v. Uniled Slales, 338 .2d 530 (D .C. Cir. 1964). See also United 
States v. U.S . Gypsllm Co. 438 U .S. 422. 462 (1978) . 
2J Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cir . 1969); Vanderbilt University 
v. Steely, 566 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1978) . 
24 United States v. Harris, 391 F .2d 348 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 
(1968); United States v . Smith , 303 F.2d 341, 343 (4th Cir. 1962). 
1.' United States v. McKinney, 822 F .2d946 95 1 (10lh Cir. 1987); Uni.tedStates 
v. Brown, 634 ".2d 1069 (7th e il'. 1980); United States v. Silvern , 484 F.2d 879 
(7th Cir. 1973) . See also People v. Ali , 47 N.Y.2d 920 393 N.E.2d 481 , 419 
N.Y.S.2d 487 (1979) ( ugg ·ting that supplemental instruction be given during 
main charge). The ABA standard a lso recommends that the in truction be given 
before the jury retires for deliberalj n. See ABA, note 17 supra, § 15-4.4(a). 
26 Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969) . 
27 United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 , 967 (lIth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
233 (1989) . 
2B Compare United States v. Contreras, 463 F .2d 773 (9th ir. 1972) (rever ible 
error to give Allen charge to jury without any indication jury deadlocked) with 
United States v. Martinez, 446 F .2d 11 8 (2d ir . cerro del/ied, 404 U.S. 944 
(1971) (no error to give such charge sua sponte to deliberating jury) and S uza v. 
Ellerthorpe, 712 F.2d 1529 (1st Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 464 U.S. 1048 ( 1984) 
(setting deadline sua sponte held not coercive) . 
29 Golden v. First City Nat ' l Bank, 751 S. W .2d 639 (Tex . Ct. App. 1988). But 
see United States v. Webb, 816 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987) (initial consent to inquiry 
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by suggesting that the attorney did not at the time believe that the 
jury was being coerced. 30 
Threats and Intimidation 
As with verdict-urging instructions, a judge must not use 
other techniques to pressure a jury to reach a verdict. To be sure, 
there is a fine line between permissible encouragement and 
impermissible coercion. Nevertheless, despite the judge's desire 
for a verdict, he must not fail to advise jurors that they should 
adhere to their conscience and free will in making their decision. 
Otherwise, legitimate dissenting jurors will feel that they are 
somehow responsible for undermining the cause of justice. 
Judicial demands for a verdict are ordinarily found coercive 
because they impact most heavily upon the recalcitrant jurors, 
implying that these jurors are delaying the cause of justice. The 
Supreme Court has addressed this problem on several occasions. 
In Jenkins v. United States , 3 1 the Court reversed a conviction 
when the judge admonished a deadlocked jury: "You have got 
to reach a decision in this case. " Although no specific prejudice 
was found, inherent prejudice existed based on. the unacceptable 
risk that impermissible factors would produce a decision. 32 Simi-
lar strident warnings that, in effect, order a jury to agree on a 
verdict have been held legally coercive. Thus, statements such 
as, "I'm going to get a verdict in this case, " 33 "There has to be 
a verdict , ' '34 "You are supposed to find guilt or innocence here-
do your job, " 35 or "It is the intention of this court to keep its 
jury in session for as long as it may take to arrive at a verdict' '36 
have been held impermissibly coercive. Also coercive is openly 
telling a jury that the case is a simple one since such a statement 
into jury's numerical division did not waive claim as to giving of subsequent Allen 
charge) . 
30 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 , 240 (1988) . 
31 380 U.S. 445 , 446 (1965). 
n Holbl' ok v. Flynn , 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1976) (the test for inherent prejudice 
is " not whetber jurors actualJy articulated a consciousness of some prejud i ial 
effe t, but ralher whether an unacceptab1e risk is presented of impermis. ible factors 
coming into play " ). 
33 Ex parte, Morris, 465 So . 2d 1180, 1182 (Ala. 1985). 
34 United States v. Assi, 748 F.2d 62 , 68 (2d Cir. 1984). 
35 Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140, 1142 (D.C. 1977) . 
36 People v. Carter, 40 N. Y.2d 933,358 N.E.2d 517,389 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1976). 
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implies dlat the case warrant only de ultory deliberation and 
thereby risks putting undue pressure on legitimate dis entjng 
jurors that the judge considers their position untenabJe. TlaIs, a 
judge's remarks that h "could have decided this case in ten 
minutes' 37 or that ' there shou ld [not] be any great difficulty in 
arriving at a verdict in this case' .I~ are intimidating and coercive. 
By contrast, remarks that strongly encourage jurors to adhere to 
their oaths and try to reach a verdict one way or the other have 
been held not coercive when the judge's statements do not appear 
to impose on any juror the surrender of her beliefs. 39 
A judge must be careful when giving supplemental instruc-
tions to avoid singling out individual minority jurors, either 
directly or by implication with intimidating remarks that onvey 
... tile message that they must agre with the majority. -10 When a 
judge learns during deliberations of a juror problem that, if 
unattended might later require the granting of a mistrial the 
judge should immediately intervene to obviate the problem. ~ I 
This interventi n includes the power to investigate aJIegati ns of 
juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an 
IIII offending juror. 42 
37 People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 532, 517 N.E.2d 520, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842 
(1987). 
3' Boyett v. United States, 48 F.2d 482,483 (5th Cir. 1931). 
q United States v. Markey, 693 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1982) (advising jury that 
courthou e would be availab le the followi.ng morning, Christma ' Eve if jury unable 
to reach a consen u thal aftemoon not coercive); Williams v. United States 419 
F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cerro denied, 409 U.S. 872 (1972) (ordering jury 
back to jury room after poll produced confusion among one juror not coercive ; 
Richard on v. State, 508 So. 2d 289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (inquiring into 
jury 's numerical diviion and di uadlng jury from reviewing certain evidence not 
coercive)' People v. Pagan 45 N.Y .2d 725,380 N.B .2d 299,408 N.Y.S.2d 473 
(1978) (admonishing jury that case was simple and that they were expected lO arrive 
at verdicl not coercive); People v. Sharff, 38 N.Y .2d 75 1, 343 N.E.2d 765 381 
N.Y .S.2d 48 (1975) (advising jury that it would be sequestered if it did not reach a 
verdict not coercive). 
40 Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderbur 432 N.E .2d 418 (lnd. Ct. App. 
1982) deadlock instruction given after identity of recalcitrant jurors known); People 
v. Hud on, 104 A.D.2d 157,482 N.Y.S.2d 1009 ( 1984) (judge directs intimidating 
remark specifical ly at two dissenting jurors); People v . Perfetto, 96 A.D .2d 517, 
464 N. Y .S.2d 818 (1983) ( inglingoUland confronting \oneminority juror inherently 
coercive). 
41 People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478,758 P.2d 1081,250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988) 
(juror claimed to be unable to vote for death penalty). 
42 People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P .2d 1251,224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986) 
(reports that juror was intoxicated on marijuana); People V. McNeal, 90 Cal. App. 
3d 830, 153 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1979) (juror indicates personal knowledge of disputed 
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Any intervention must be conducted with care, however, so 
as to minimize pressure on legitimate minority jurors by advising 
them that no verdict is being demanded and that a change in vote 
must be a conscientious one. 43 No juror should be induced to 
agree to a verdict by fear that a failure to agree will be regarded 
as reflecting upon either his intelligence or integrity. 44 Thus, it 
was "egregious" for a judge, after learning that a juror was 
having difficulty following her oath, to direct an instruction 
toward that juror that intimated she was guilty of either perjury 
or negligence in her response to questions on voir dire, and that 
she was not complying with her oath as a juror. 45 If it becomes 
clear that a juror is incapable of fairly reaching a verdict, the 
declaration of a mistrial may be in order. 46 
Singling out a dissenting juror and engaging in a one-on-one 
discussion as to whether the juror is obstructing an agreement on 
a verdict is inherently coercive. 47 Threatening the jury with 
deliberations for an indefinite period until a lone dissenter capitu-
lates is obviously coercive. 48 A judge acts properly, however, 
when he conducts a discrete and nonthreatening investigation to 
evaluate a report that a juror may harbor a disqualifying bias or 
is otherwise incapable of rendering a verdict. 49 
A judge may not place a jury under any explicit time con-
straints that seek to induce a verdict more swiftly than the ends 
of justice will allow. 50 The amount of time that a deliberating 
facts). 
The broad discretionary authority of a judge to investigate allegations of juror 
irregularity during the trial is well settled. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 
522 (1985); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983). The procedures adopted, 
however, must be protective of a defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial 
jury. United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 
(1983); United States v. Dominguez, 615 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1980). A judge also 
has the power to dismiss a juror who is "unable or disqualified to perform his 
duties." Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c). See United States v. Rodriguez, 573 F.2d 330 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
43 United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8, 13 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,429 
U.S. 1101 (1977). 
44 Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140,1142 (D.C. App. 1977). 
45 [d. 
46 [d. 
47 People v. Perfetto, 96 A.D.2d 517,464 N. Y.S.2d 818 (1983). 
48 People v. Carter, 40 N.Y.2d 933,358 N.E.2d 517,389 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1976). 
49 People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478,758 P.2d 1081,250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988). 
50 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F .2d 637, 640 (5th Cir. 1976) ("court's 
opening remarks to the jurors emphasizing the dispatch he expected, coupled with 
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jury should be kept together and the determination of whether a 
mistrial should be declared if the jury cannot agree are matters 
within a judge's sound discretion. 51 Ordinarily, a jury must have 
deliberated for an extensive period, and the judge must be 
satisfied that agreement is unlikely within a reasonable time 
before a judge may discharge thejury.52 Asking ajury to "see if 
you can't reach a verdict within an hour" is plainly coercive 
because it empbasizes peed over care and infers that the judge 
is anxious to oncLude the ase. 53 Less explicit remarks may still 
be found coercive if they imply a time frame within which a 
verdict is to be reached. 54 Even concern for the jury's well-being 
does not justify the judge's placing a time limit on when a verdict 
must be reached. S5 A judge faced with emergent circumstances 
must explore reasonable alternatives, including the declaration 
of a mistrial. Not all time-related remarks, however, are coer-
cive. The test is whether from all the circumstances the judge's 
remarks conveyed the impression that it was more important for 
the jury to be quick than to be th ughtfu I. SI) 
Nor may a judge threaten the jury with equestration express 
an intention to confme them indefinitely, r impose unendurable 
conditions upon a jury as a mean of pressuring them to reach a 
the imm derate treatment accorded defense counsel for his allegedly unju titled 
attempts to delay the trial, can only be judged by us t have put pressure on the jury 
to reach a verdict more swiftly than the ends f justice will allow '); People v. 
K eoan, 46 al. 3d 478 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550(1988) (judge's remarks 
n Friday that h would " appreciate" a verdict on Monday n t c ercive due to 
cautionary instructions to minority jurors not t surrender conscientiou Iy held 
beliefs). 
51 People v. Sheldon , 136 A.D.2d 761,523 N.Y.S .2d 220 (l988). Deliberation 
tim all wed varies with the length of the trial. An average hung jury deliberales 
longer than the average jury that reaches a verdict by a ratio of about three-to-one. 
H. Kalven&H. Zeisel, note 2 supra, at 4.59. 
52 [d. It should be noted that serious double jeopardy claims would arise if the 
judge declares a mistrial prematurely. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497 
(1978); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). 
53 Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 433 (lOth Cir. 1966). 
54 United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8,9 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1101 (1977) (suggesting thntjury try to reach a verdict in one hour, and referring to 
previous jury deliberation that lasted nine days, held unduly coercive). 
55 Lucas v. American Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291,293 (5th Cir. 1980) (advising 
jury that due to impending hurricane it must reach verdict within fifteen minutes 
was coercive). 
56 United States v. Markey, 693 F .2d 594 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Green, 
523 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); Butler v. State, 
185 Tenn. 686, 207 S.W.2d 584 (1948). 
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verdict. 57 Thus, requiring a jury to deliberate for twenty-seven 
hours without sleep was found unduly coercive. 58 Similarly 
improper was requiring a jury to deliberate until 5:25 A.M., 
notwithstanding their impatience and fatigue. 59 Under appropriate 
circumstances, the availability of sequestration at a hotel for the 
night may be noted as a possibility, although not as a threat. 60 
Threatening to keep the jury" in session" and" incommunicado" 
until a verdict is reached is intimidating and coercive, 61 as are 
threats of sequestration when the judge is aware that some of the 
jurors have conflicts with such an arrangement. 62 
Problems occasionally arise during the polling of a jury 
following the rendition of a verdict. 63 A valid verdict is not 
dependent on what a juror agrees to in the jury room but, rather, 
on what the juror agrees to when the jury gives its verdict in 
open court. 64 A juror has the right when polled to dissent from a 
verdict to which he had agreed in the jury room. 65 When this type 
j7 Boyett v. United Stales 48 F.2d 482 484 (5th Cir . 193 1) (j udge's remark 
sugge. ted that some of jurors derelict in their duty and that judge intended to punjsh 
them by keeping tbem confined indefinitely until they reached a verdict). See al 0 
United States v. Chaney , 559 F.2d 1094 (71b Cir. 1 977)(supplemental cha rge could 
have been unders[o d as demanding quick verdict to avoid being locked up for 
night). 
58 State v. Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963). 
59 Commonwealth v. Clark, 404 Pa. 143, 170 A.2d 847 (1961) . 
6lJ Compare People v. Pagan, 45 N.Y.2d 725, 380 N. E.2d 299, 408 N.Y.S.2d 
473 (1978) (appropriate reference to possible sequestration) and People v. Sharff, 
38 N.Y.2d 751, 343 N.E.2d 765,381 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1975) ( ame) with People v. 
Hudson, 104 A.D.2d 157, 482 N.Y.S .2d 1009 (1984) (threatening jurors with 
sequestration because of two recalcitrant jurors). 
61 People v. Carter, 40 N.Y.2d 933,358 N.E.2d 517, 389 N.Y.S .2d 835 (1976) . 
62 State v. Jones , 292 N.C. 513,234 S.E.2d 555 (1977) (judge knew that some 
of jurors had abnormal conflicts and had promised two jurors that court would not 
be held over weekend, but nevertheless gratuitously threatened to confine them over 
weekend unless they reached verdict). 
63 Section 15-4.5 ofthe ABA Standards/or Criminallustiee provides: 
When a verdict has been returned and before the jury has dispersed, the jury shall 
be polled at the request of any party or upon the court s own motion. The poll 
shall be conducted by the court or clerk of COurl asking each juror individually 
whether the verdict announced is his or her verdict. If upon the poll there is not 
unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations 
or may be discharged. 
ABA, note 17 supra , § 15-4.5. See United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.) 
(en bane) (poll not impermissibly coercive), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 966 (1988). 
64 Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy , 126 F.2d 224,225 (D.C. Cir. 
1942). 
65 [d. It should be noted, however, that there is no absolute right to have a jury 
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of dissent occurs, the jury may be directed to continue their 
deliberations, or they may be discharged. 66 If the jury is directed 
to continue deliberations, no time limit should be set. 67 Moreover, 
it is improper for the judge to interrogate the polled juror, enter 
into an argument with that juror, or require an explanation of his 
change of position. 6H 
When polling reveals the possibility of some irregularity 
during the deliberation process, the judge must inquire into the 
problem. 69 This inquiry might include questioning the juror 
privately about matters not within the deliberative process70 and 
then taking remedial action , such a requiring further delibera-
tions, attempting to dissipate the cause of the problem, replacing 
the juror, or declaring a mistrial. 71 
Inquiry Into Numerical Division 
A judge's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury on 
the merits of the verdict may be impermissibly coercive on 
dissenting jurors72 regardless of whether the judge's inquiry 
specific:.llly asks the jury which side is favored. In Burton v. 
United States, 73 the Supreme Court criticized the practice of 
polled. United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724 (7th CiT.) cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 852 (1978). If the request for a poll is not made before the verdict is recorded, 
it comes too late . [d. at 724 n.3. 
66 United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp . 318,339 (D.N.J. 1982). Rule 31(d) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
When a verdict is returned and before it is record d the jury hall b polled at the 
request of any party or upon the court's own motion. If upon the poU there is not 
unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations 
or may be discharged. 
61 State v. Sutton , 31 N .C. App. 697 ,230 S.E.2d 572 (1976) (judge sends jury 
back to deliberate and tells them "to tuke n0 more than five minutes to ascertain 
whether or not the verdict which you reported yesterday was unanimous"). 
68 Compare Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F .2d 224 (D.C . 
Cir. 1942) (judge demands explanation for juror's apparent change of position) with 
Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C . Cir. 1969) (judge acts properly to 
attempt to clear up confusion from poll). 
~. People v. Pickett 61 N.Y.2d 773,461 N.E.2d 294,473 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1984) 
(juror responds that verdict was arrived at "under duress "). 
'I\J The judge should be carefu I however, not to inquire about matters that occurred 
during the deliberation themselves.ld. 
11 !d. 
12 See Annotation, "Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Trial Court's Inquiry as 
to Numerical Division oOury," 77 A.L.R.3d 769 (1977). 
n 196 U.S. 283 (1905). 
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making such an inquiry, noting that such questioning serves no 
useful purpose, and can be harmful. 74 Later, in Brasfield v. 
United States, 75 the Court held that any judicial inquiry into a 
deliberating jury's numerical division is per se reversible error. 
Brasfield elaborated on the reasons for condemning the practice 
of inquiring into a jury's numerical division: 
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that 
the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such 
procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions 
not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its 
effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which 
cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts 
and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency 
is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some 
degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon 
the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that 
of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be 
excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, 
is not to be sanctioned. 76 
Brasfield can be understood as a prophylactic rule designed 
to protect the jury from the unpredictable effects of both the 
inquiry itself and the jury's knowledge of the judge's awareness 
of its division. Both can exert subtle pressure on some jurors. 
The Brasfield decision reflects a legitimate concern that trial 
judges scrupulously refrain from encroaching into the jury's 
deliberative process to ensure that the deliberations are candid 
and uninhibited. Moreover, when coupled with verdict-urging 
instructions, the inquiry can create the impression that the court 
agrees with the majority, thereby reinforcing the majority's 
determination and melting the resistance of the minority. 77 
74 The Court observed: "[W]e do not think that the proper administration of the 
law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding 
judge." Id. at 308. 
75 272 U.S. 448 (1926). 
76 Id. at 450. For other cases condemning the practice, see United States v. Webb, 
816 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Hayes, 446 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Cook, 254 F.2d 871 (5th 
Cir. 1958). See also E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 
§ 5.22 (3d ed. 1977) (a "cardinal rule that the court should not ask the jury as to 
their numerical division"). 
77 Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823 (D.C. App. 1988) (when jury reveals its 
numerical division and judge then gives deadlock instruction, "potential for coercion 
is great"); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 692, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973) 
(inquiry ordinarily "carries the improper suggestion that the state of numerical 
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Although there has been orne disagreement 11\ Brasfield 
clearJy was not ba ed on the constitutional dictate of due process 
but, rather, rep res nted an exerci e of the Supreme Curt s 
supervisory powers over the lower federal courts. 7" Inasmuch as 
the decision was not constitutionally grounded state c U1is need 
not follow it,8o and federal courts are not required to invoke 
its sanction when reviewing state habeas corpus proceedings 
alleging a Brasfield violation. 8' 
Those state courts that follow the underlying rationale of 
Brasfield if not its automatic reversaJ policy, examine whether 
the inquiry was unduly coerc ive. These curts make this determi-
nation by analyzing the totality of the circum tances. 8Z For 
example, repetition of the numerical inquiry aggravate the 
impr pIiety. ~l Administering verdict-urging instructions in con-
junction with the numerical inquiry, as noted ab ve, exa erbate 
the coercive potential by placing undue pressure on min dty 
jurors .8•1 The absen e of ameliorative language is also a relevant 
factor. 8s Counsel's reque t for the numerical inquiry however, 
can constitute a waiver of the claim. 86 
division reflects the stage of the deliberations. It has the doubly coercive effect 
of melting the resistance of the minority and freezing the determination of the 
majority"). 
78 See State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91,547 P.2d 574 (1976), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 
206,549 P.2d 284, and 455 U.S. 845 (1981); People V. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 
213 N.W.2d 193 (1973). 
79 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 239-240 (1988). 
80 Several state courts see nothing inherently wrong in such an inquiry. See State 
v. Morant, 758 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 
810,69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353 (1968); Griffin v. State, 2 Ark. App. 145, 
617 S.W.2d 21 (1981). 
~, Lowcnfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. at 240 n.3. See Locks V. Sumner 703 F.2d 
403 (9th Cir.). cerr. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); United States ex ret. Kirk V. 
Dire tor, Dep't fCorreclions, 678 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1982)' Cornell v. Iowa, 628 
F.2d 1044 (8th Cir.), cerro denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1980); E lli v. Reed, 596 F.2d 
1195 (4th CiJ·.), cen. denied, 444 U .S . 973 (1979). 
82 Richardson v. State, 508 So. 2d 289 (Ala. Crim. App. J987); State V. McEntire, 
323 S.E.2d 439 (N .C. Ct. App. 1984); People V. Santiago 108 Ill. App. 3d 787, 
64 Ill. Dec. 319,439 N.E.2d 984 (1982) ; State v. Roberts , t31 Ariz. 513,642 P.2d 
858 (1982). 
83 Santiago, 108 III. App. 3d at 787. 
84 United States v. Webb, 816 F .2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987); Smith V. United States, 
542 A.2d 823 (D.C. App. 1988); State V. Rickerson, 95 N.M. 666,625 P.2d 1183, 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 845 (1981). 
8~ Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140 (D.C. App. 1977). 
86 Marsh V. Cupp, 536 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 '(1-976) . 
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Even unsolicited disclosures to the judge of the jury's division 
can be grounds for reversal. 87 A jury note to the judge, for 
example, can reveal the jury's division, and even the identity of 
the dissenting jurors. 88 Giving a verdict-urging instruction in such 
circumstances could reasonably be interpreted as being directed 
at the dissenters and thereby be found impermissibly coercive of 
these jurors. 89 A judge who learns of the jury's division through 
an unsolicited report may in some circumstances be required to 
declare a mistrial. 90 Unsolicited disclosures can also result in 
reversal when, for example, a judge's inquiry concerning the 
jury's request for a review of testimony develops into an inquiry 
concerning the jury's division. 91 Such an occurrence can create a 
"coercive atmosphere," particularly when the judge singles out 
individual jurors for questioning. 92 
A judge's inquiry into the jury's numerical split on matters 
unrelated to the merits of the verdict is permissible. The Supreme 
Court recently addressed this issue in Lowenfield v. Phelps. 93 
There, after being advised that the jury was deadlocked, the 
judge in open court asked the jurors to write on a piece of paper 
his or her name and whether further deliberations would be 
helpful in arriving at a verdict. The jurors complied. The count 
was eight affirmative votes and four negative votes. After some 
confusion, the judge again reiterated the question in slightly 
different form, and the jury responded, eleven-to-one, that fur-
ther deliberations would be helpful. The judge then reinstructed 
the jury as to their duty to attempt to reach a verdict. 
87 Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But see United 
States v. Rao, 394 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.) (no error where jury volunteered its division 
but did not indicate which side it favored), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968); 
People v. Sheldon, 136 A.D.2d 761,523 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1988). 
It is error for the foreman to reveal the numerical division of the jury. United 
States v. Jennings, 471 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973); 
Mullin v. {jnited States, 356 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Smith v. United States, 
542 A.2d 823 (D.C. App. 1988). 
88 United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. United 
States, 368 A.2d 1140 (D.C. App. 1977). 
89 Jackson, 368 A.2d 1140. 
90 Id. at 1142. 
91 United States v. Akbar, 698 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959 
(1983). 
92 Id. at 380. 
93 484 U.S. 231 (1988). 
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The Supreme Court approved the judge's inquiry. Distin-
guishing Brasfield, the Court noted that such an inquiry was 
clearly different from an inquiry into the merits because there 
was no reason to believe that a juror who was in the minority on 
the merits would necessarily conclude that further dehberations 
would not be helpful. The Court observed: 
We believe the type of question asked by the trial ourl in this case is 
exactly what the Court in Brasfield implicitly approved when it tated: 
"[An inquiry as to numerical divis ionJ serves no useful purpose that 
cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to rcveal lhe nature 
of its division. "94 
Although the supplemental instruction and the return of a verdict 
thirty minutes later suggested the 'possibility of coercion, "95 
defense counsel's failure to object indicated that • the potential 
for coercion now argued was not apparent to one on the spot. "96 
Ex Parte Communications 
A judge should not communicate with the jury on any matter 
pertaining to the case except after giving notice to the parties and 
affording them a reasonable opportunity to be present and to be 
heard. 97 This rule against ex parte contacts i based on concerns 
of orderly trial procedure and ensuring that the jury remains 
impartial. Proper procedure requires certain precautions. 9S The 
jury 's inquiry should be in writing, the note should be marked as 
a court exhibit and read into the record in the presence of cOllnsel 
and the parties, counsel should be afforded an opportunity to 
suggest appropriate . responses, and the jury should be recalled. 
94 [d. at 240. See also Carlton v. United States, 395 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1030 (1969). 
9S Lowenfeld, 484 U.S. at 240. 
96 [d. 
91 ABA note 17 supra, § 15-3.7 Gudge .. bouJd not communicate with a juror 
or the jury on any aspect f the case itself (as distinguished from matters relating LO 
physical comforts and the like) , except after notice to all partie and reasonable 
opportunity for them to be present'·). See also Annotation, " Propriety aod Prejudi-
cial Effect in Federal Criminal Cases , of Communications Between Judge and Jury 
Members Made in the Ab ence of Counsel, Regarding the Ability of Jury Member 
to Continue Deliberations," 64 A.L.R. Fed. 874 (1983)' Annotation, "Propriety 
and Prejudicial Effect, in Federal Civil Ca es, of Communications Between Judge 
and Jury Made Out of Counsel's Pre ence and After Submission for Deliberations " 
32 A.L.R. Fed. 392 (1977). 
98 United States v. Ronder, 639 F .2d 931 ,934 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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The judge should then read into the record the jury's note, and 
give the response. 99 
The Supreme Court on several occasions has delineated the 
permissible scope of ex parte contacts between judge and jury. 
In Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co. ,100 a personal injury lawsuit, 
the deliberating jury sent a note to the judge asking for further 
instructions about the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The 
judge sent a written response back to the jury without notifying 
the parties and without recalling the jury in open court. Conclud-
ing that engaging in this ex parte communication was error, the 
Court observed: 
We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential 
to the proper protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who 
attend for the purpose to be present in person or by counsel at all 
proceedings from the time the jury is impaneled until it is discharged 
after rendering the verdict. Where a jury has retired to consider its 
verdict, and supplementary instructions are required, either because 
asked for by the jury or for other reasons, they ought to be given either 
in the presence of counselor after notice and an opportunity to be 
present; and written instructions ought not to be sent to the jury 
without notice to counsel and an opportunity to object. Under ordinary 
circumstances, and wherever practicable, the jury ought to be recalled 
to the court room, where counsel are entitled to anticipate, and bound to 
presume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that all proceedings in 
the trial will be had. In this case the trial court erred in giving a 
supplementary instruction to the jury in the absence of the parties and 
without affording them an opportunity either to be present or to make 
timely objection to the instruction. 101 
The Court explicitly found that the supplementary instruction 
was harmful since it related to a substantive element in the case, 
was legally erroneous, and "was calculated to mislead the 
jury. "102 
The principle of Fillippon was later applied to a criminal case 
in Shields v. United States. 103 There, the judge similarly responded 
to a jury note indicating a partial verdict by directing the jury 
'19 Occasionally, the personal nature of a note may make it appropriate to forgo 
reading it to the entire jury, and recalling the jury into the courtroom may be 
unnecessary when the inquiry concerns housekeeping details. Id. 
100 250 U.S. 76 (1919). 
101 Id. at 8l. 
102 Id. at 82. 
103 273 U.S. 583 (1927). 
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to continue deliberations on the remaining defendants. This 
communication was not made in open court, and neither the 
defendants nor their attorneys were present or advised of these 
interchanges. The Court reversed the conviction without finding 
any specific prejudice. It noted that' 'the rule of orderly conduct 
of jury trial entitl[es] the defendant, especially in a criminal case, 
to be present from the time the jury is impaneled until its 
discharge after rendering the verdict. ' , 104 
The Fillippon-Shields principle was reaffirmed in Rogers v. 
United States. 105 There, in response to a jury note inquiring 
whether the judge would accept a guilty verdict with "extreme 
mercy of the Court," the judge instructed the bailiff' 'to advise 
the jury that the Court's answer was in the affirmative." 106 These 
communications were in private, without notice to defendant or 
an opportunity for counsel to respond. Pointing out that Rule 43 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantees a defen-
dant the right to be present "at every stage of the trial including 
the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict," the 
Court held that the jury's message should have been answered in 
open court and that defendant's counsel should have been given 
an opportunity to be heard before the judge responded. 107 
Although the Court agreed that a violation of Rule 43 could 
be harmless, such a conclusion was not warranted here, since 
the violation was' 'fraught with potential prejudice. ' , 108 The Court 
explained that the judge should not have indicated a willingness 
to accept the jury's request. Rather, the judge should have 
advised the jury that its request would not be binding on the court 
and that, in any event, the jury had no sentencing function and 
was required to reach its verdict without regard to sentence. 
Moreover, the jury returned its verdict within five minutes of 
receiving the judge's response, a circumstance that "strongly 
suggests that the trialjudge's response may have induced unanim-
ity by giving members of the jury who had previously hesitated 
about reaching a guilty verdict the impression that the recommen-
dation might be an acceptable compromise. ' '109 
104 Id. at 588-589. 
105 422 U.S. 35 (1975) . 
106 Id. at 36. 
107 Id. at 39. 
108 Id. at 41. 





The requirement and extent of the prejudice that needs to be 
shown from a judge's ex parte contacts with a deliberating jury 
was further examined in United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co. 110 
There, during extensive deliberations, the foreman asked to 
confer with the judge about the condition of the jury. Defense 
counsel agreed to the judge's proposed ex parte conference. At 
the meeting, the foreman advised the judge of the deteriorating 
state of health of the jurors after the lengthy trial and twice 
indicated that the jury was deadlocked. Near the close of the 
meeting, the following colloquy took place: III 
The Court: I would like to ask the jurors to continue their deliberations 
and I will take into consideration what you have told me. That is all I 
can say. 
Mr. Russell (foreman): I appreciate it. It is a situation I don't know how 
to help you get what you are after. 
The Court: Oh, I am not after anything. 
Mr. Russell: You are after a verdict one way or the other. 
The Court: Which way it goes doesn't make any difference to me. 
The judge informed counsel of the substance of the meeting but 
omitted reference to the foreman's opinion that the jury was 
deadlocked and to the foreman's impression that the judge wanted 
a definite verdict. 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that 
the judge's ex parte communications with the jury foreman 
encroached on the jury's authority and foreclosed a possible' 'no 
verdict" outcome by giving the foreman the impression that the 
judge wanted a verdict. The event was "disturbing" for several 
reasons. First, just as "any ex parte meeting . . . is pregnant 
with possibilities for error, " the instant case amply demonstrated 
the' 'pitfalls inherent in such an enterprise. "112 Moreover, "unex-
pected questions or comments can generate unintended and 
misleading impressions of the judge's subjective personal views 
which have no place in his instruction to the jury-all the more 
so when counsel are not present to challenge the statements. "113 
Second, any ex parte communication to the jury through one 
110 438 U.S. 422 (1978) . 
III [d. at 432. 
112 [d. at 460. 
113 [d. at 461. 
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member of the panel risks innocent misstatements of law and 
misinterpretations whose content cannot be determined. 114 Third, 
the absence of counsel from the meeting and the unavailability 
of a transcript aggravate the problems of having one juror serve 
as a conduit for communicating instructions to the whole panel. 115 
The Court concluded: 
Thus, it is not simply the action of the judge in having the private meeting 
with the jury foreman, standing alone-undesirable as that procedure 
is-which constitutes the error; rather, it is the fact that the ex parte 
discussion was inadvertently allowed to drift into what amounted to a 
supplemental instruction to the foreman relating to the jury 's obligation 
to return a verdict, coupled with the fact that counsel were denied any 
chance to correct whatever mistaken impression the foreman might have 
taken from this conversation, that we find most troubling. 11 6 
Although no actual prejudice was found, the Court, citing 
Jenkins v. United States, 117 determined that inherent prejudice 
was shown by the jury's swift return of a verdict following the 
ex parte meeting, thereby suggesting a "risk" that the foreman 
believed that the judge wanted a verdict and then conveyed that 
impression to the jury. 118 
114 Id. 
115Id. 
116 Id. at 462 . 
117 380 U .S. 445 (1965). 
118 Id. at 462 . The Supreme Court has addressed issues involving ex parte contacts 
between the trial judge and a jur r during the trial in two recent decision . 
In Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983), the Court held in a pel' curiam opinion 
that the judge's private unrecorded meeting with a juror concerning her fear that 
cel1ain ev.iden e might up et her. even if a constitutional error, wa hamlless. This 
"innocuous " meeting did not include di cuss ion of any factual or legal matters 
pertaining to the case and the jury 's deliberations were not found to have been 
biased . Although' ' the right to personal presence at alJ critjcal stages of the trial and 
the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each crimjnal defendant, the ' day-
to-day realities of courtroom life" also bave to be considered . [d. at 117- 119. 
"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or mol' juror do not have occasion 
to speak to the trial judge ~Ibout something, whether it relates to a matter of personal 
comfort or to ' orne a pect of the trial. " [d. at 118. The Court empha ized that e 
parte contacts could be of serious concern, and that convictions should be overturned 
when prejudice i shown . 
In United Stares v. Gagn n, 470 U.S . 522 1985) the judge held an ex parte 
meeting with njuror who was concerned about the defendant's sketching her p rtrait. 
Defendant 'S counsel wa pre en[ at the meeting and did n t object. CiLing Rushell 
the Court in a per curiam opinion held that the mere occurrence of an ex parle 
conversation between judge and juror in the absence of the defendant did not deprive 
the defendant of any con ' titutional right. The encounter was a "short interLude in a 
complex trial" and "was not the sort of event which every defendant had a right 
personally to attend under the Fifth Amendment. " Id. at 527. The Court noted that 
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Federal and state appellate courts ordinarily review ex parte 
communications according to the nature of the communication 
(i.e., whether it related to a substantive issue in the case or 
whether it concerned nonsubstantive matters). 119 Substantive 
communications would include communications pertaining to 
legal and factual issues in the case, whereas nonsubstantive 
communications relate to the extent of deliberations, the avail-
ability of items of evidence, and housekeeping matters, such as 
meal orders. The courts also examine the manner in which the 
communication was made and ordinarily apply waiver doctrine 
when counsel fails to protest the occurrence. The most decisive 
factor, as the Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, is the 
potential for prejudice, or the presence or absence of actual 
prejudice, from the communication. 
The courts scrutinize more closely ex parte communications 
that relate to legal or factual matters in the case since such 
communications can carry a presumption of prejudice in favor 
of the aggrieved party. 120 Thus, ex parte responses to a jury's 
question about substantive matters, such as (1) the standard for 
contributory negligence; 121 (2) the measure of damages under a 
contract; 122 (3) principles of estoppel; 123 (4) construction of a 
contract; 124 (5) interpretation of a criminal statute; 125 (6) the need 
for unanimity for a verdict; 126 (7) separability of substantive 
defendants could have done nothing at the conference, and, indeed, their presence 
might have been counterproductive. The Court also held that counsel's failure to 
object to defendants' presence constituted a waiver of defendant's statutory right of 
presence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. [d. 
See also United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 912 (1988); United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 917 (1983); LaChappelle v. Moran, 699 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1983); People 
v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 369,403 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1978). 
119 United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 
(1989); People v. France, 436 Mich. 138,461 N.W.2d 621 (1990). 
120 Wallace v. Duckworth, 597 F. Supp. 1,2 (N.D. Ind. 1983); France, 436 
Mich. at 139, 461 N.W.2d at 622. 
121 Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919). 
122 Nations v. Sun Oil Co., 695 F.2d 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 
(1983). 
123 South Leasing v. Williams, 778 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1039 (1985). 
124 Vogel v. American Warranty Home Servo Corp., 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
125 Collins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 289, 381 S.E.2d 430 (1989). 
126 Henry v. State, 548 So.2d 570 (Ala. 1989). 
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offenses from conspiracy; 127 (8) the overt act requirement for 
conspiracy; m and (9) any jury polling following the verdict, 129 
were found prejudicial and required reversal. Similarly, ex parte 
communications on nonsubstantive matters, such as responding 
to a jury note inquiring whether the judge would accept a 
particular verdict,130 or urging a deadl cked jury to continue 
deliberating, 131 can also result in reversal. The courts disapprove 
of a per se rule f reversal lJ2 and analyze the ex parte communica-
tion for actual or potential prejudice. 133 Cases finding lack of 
prejudice look at the sub tance of the communicati n 134 the 
re pOl1sivene s of the judge's communication to the jury's com-
munication IJS the xtent of the deliberations after the ex parte 
communication,136 and any curative instructions given to the 
jury. 137 
Apart from the substance and timing of the ex parte communi-
cation, some courts find that the error has been aggravated by 
127 United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981). 
128 United States v. Burns, 683 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173 
(1982). 
129 Rhodes v. State, 547 So . 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989). 
130 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975). 
13 1 Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927); United States v. Ronder, 639 
F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981); People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431,391 N.E.2d 1347,418 
N.Y .S.2d 371 (1979); People v. Payne, 149 A.D.2d 542,540 N.Y .S.2d 256 (1989) . 
132 People v. France, 436 Mich. 138,461 N.W.2d 621 (1990). 
133 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States v. 
Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1985); United States, ex rei. SEC v. Billingsley, 
766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985); Krische v. Smith, 662 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1981). 
1}oI Smith v. Kel..o , 863 F.2d 1564 (lith Cir.), cere. denied. 490 U.S . J072 
(1989) ; United State. v. Blackmon. 839 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Bustamante, 805 P.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1986)' United Stales . Widgery , 778 '.2d 325 
(7th Cir. 1985) ' Skill v. Martinez, 671 F .2d 368 (3d Cir. 1982); People v. Aveille 
148 A.D.2d 461 538 N.Y.S.2d 615 (989) ; People v. Moran . 123 A.D.2d 646, 
507 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986). 
135 United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 
(1989); United States v. Breedlove, 576 F .2d 57 (5th Cir. 1978); Watson v. State, 
728 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
1.10 ompare United States v. RondeI' , 639 F .2d 931 (2d ir . 1981) (verdi t 
reached one-balf hour after improper communication) with Krische v. Smith. 662 
F. 2d 177(2<:1 il' . 1 81)(verdictreachedone hou:randtwentyminutesal'terimproper 
communication) and United States v. Rapp 87J F .2d 957 (11th Cir.) (verdict 
reached lwenty- even hours after improper communication) , cerl. d 'flied I J 0 S. 
Ct. 233 (1989). 
131 United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (llth Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Musto, 540 F. Supp. 318 (D.N.J. 1982). 
312 
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
the manner in which the communication was made. The absence 
of the judge when a jury inquiry is received and answered can be 
error. It is improper, for example, for a judge to communicate 
with the jury through court personnel. 138 Telephonic communica-
tions with the jury is also improper, 139 as is the judge's personally 
entering the jury toom to answer the jury's questions. 140 
A claim that the judge engaged in an improper ex parte 
communication can be waived. 141 Counsel's voluntary absence 
from the courtroom may operate as a waiver, 142 as well as 
counsel's express consent to the judge engaging in an ex parte 
meeting. 143 The failure to interpose a timely objection and seek 
corrective action can also constitute a waiver. 144 A defendant also 
may waive his right to be present at a conference between 
judge and jury when he knowingly absents himself from the 
proceeding. '45 Where a statute or rule expressly commands the 
defendant's presence, however, counsel's consent to the defen-
dant's absence ordinarily will not operate as a waiver. 146 
Conclusion 
The integrity of the jury deliberation process must not be 
infringed by a judge's improper verdict-urging instructions, 
coercive remarks, or private contacts with deliberating jurors. 
138 People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371 
(1979); People v. Miller, 149 A.D.2d 439, 539 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1989). See also 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (court bailiff's improper communication 
with jury deprived defendant of constitutional right to be tried by impartial jury). 
139 Ortiz v. State, 543 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
140 State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 738 P.2d 812 (1987). 
141 United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527 (1985). 
142 Karl v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1989). 
143 United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 318, 335 (D.N.J. 1982). 
144 United States v. Bascaro, 742 F~2d 1335 (lith Cir. 1984). In re Air Crash 
Disaster, 586 F. Supp. 711, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (1985), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988); Watson v. State, 728 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987). 
145 United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 529. This situation assumes that the 
conference involves a material part of the trial at which defendant's presence would 
be meaningful. People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N:E.2d 369, 403 N.Y.S.2d 
470 (1978) (defendant's absence from informal questioning of juror in judge's 
chambers for possible disqualification not violative of defendant's right to be 
present). 
146 People v. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759,505 N.E.2d 610, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100 
(1987). 
313 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
Appellate courts carefully scrutinize deadlock instructions to 
determine whether the content or timing of the instructions 
was coercive. The courts also examine whether other coercive 
language might have induced a verdict that was the product not 
of conscienti us agreement on the merits but, rath r , that resulted 
from the pressure f time constraint and ntinued c nfinement. 
Although the standards are n t uniform, federal and tate appel-
late COUlts generally examine the judge-jury interaction on a 
case-by-case basi under the t tality of the ircumstances to 
determine whether there existed actual prejudice or a dear 
potential for prejudice. 
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